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Private environmental incentive contract and a weather signal 
Abstract 
The authors of the paper are interested in an environmental incentive payment mode for risk-averse contracting farmers. The 
incitement joins the environmental output produced by the farmer to his effort through an environmental contract reported to 
be motivating. However, the authors suppose an environmental output depending on a weather signal and consider the effect 
of a weather variable on the incentive contract. The first and usual incentive contract studied takes into account the average 
effect of a weather indicator on the farmer’s environmental output. The paper studies a second incentive contract taking into 
account the instantaneous effect of a weather indicator on the farmer’s environmental output. Then in complement of the 
reservation farmer’s utility, authors consider a minimum incentive payment given to the farmer through a constraint of a 
minimum payment for every point of farmer’s output. It is possible to increase this minimum payment in the second type 
contract (compared to the first one) without reducing the expected utility of the principal and the expected utility of the 
farmer, by increasing the level of the farmer’s environmental action. The use of such minimum farmer’s payment and the 
increase of this minimum payment could be very conclusive to bind a farmer by an environmental contract.  
Keywords: incitement, regulation, ecosystem service, minimum payment, weather, risk. 
Introduction© 
An environmental incentive contract connects a 
contracting agent (a risk-averse farmer in the paper) 
to a principal (an aquaculture producer in the paper). 
The payment of such a contract depends on the envi-
ronmental output of the farmer. This contract consid-
ers the farmer’s effort because the farmer’s environ-
mental output depends on this effort. However, the 
farmer’s environmental output can also depend on an 
exogenous risk like the weather. This is particularly 
true in agricultural and environmental economics. 
Thus, we assume a farmland located on a hillside. At 
the bottom of the hillside there is a river with an aqua-
culture. Because of intensive farmer’s agricultural 
practices, the surface water of the farmland is polluted 
and so is the river. The aquaculture producer is inter-
ested to improve the water quality by convincing the 
farmer to modify his agricultural practice. The aim is 
to obtain and to maintain a low rate of water pollution. 
Obviously, the realization of such an objective is 
impossible without scientific studies (Noble et al., 
2009), dialogues, propositions and tests with the two 
agents. We assume this necessary step achieved and 
necessary knowledge learned and known. New agri-
cultural practices and their costs, their results and 
their factors of variation were learned and known. 
After this first and necessary stage and in order to 
refine the environmental target, the setting up of 
financial incentives appears essential: the farmer 
could be bound by an environmental incentive con-
tract proposed by the aquaculture producer with a 
low cost of monitoring of the environmental results 
(rate of pesticides in the water, for example). The 
results of the farmer’s practices depend therefore on 
farmer’s efforts to carry out good practices. For 
example, public environmental management meas-
ures like European directives to protect river (Logan 
and Furse, 2002) allow the preservation of the water 
in the river. 
The theory of incentive contracts furnishes an ana-
lytic framework (Gibbons, 1998) that appears suit-
able to generate incentives because the agent’s pay-
ments (farmer’s payment in our case) are linked to 
his output performance. The risk-averse agent is thus 
motivated to undertake efforts that will lead to a satis-
factory level of environmental production. However, 
as this level of output will also depend on weather 
conditions prevailing during the implementation of the 
contract, it is necessary to take these climatic condi-
tions into account while drawing up the contract. 
Some authors, Grossman and Hart (1983), Holm-
ström (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), studied 
or demonstrated the advantage of using a signal on 
the agent’s effort furnished in an incentive contract. 
First, the more information the principal has to draw 
up the contract, the more precise the contract will 
be. Second, because of incentives, the agent’s utility 
becomes variable, (Salanié, 1997). Thus, it is possi-
ble to take into account the risk attached to an 
agent’s contractual payment in relation with the type 
of the probability distribution of the agent’s results. 
The usual payment given to a contracting farmer 
(the agent) that is bound by an environmental incen-
tive contract considers an average climatic effect on 
the farmer’s environmental output. Actually, this is 
a simplification that it is possible to overrun by con-
sidering the climatic effect for every point of the 
farmer’s output. The farmer’s payment would de-
pend simultaneously on the farmer’s environmental 
output and on the value of a climatic signal. But in 
this case, it would be necessary to control the vari-
ability of the farmer’s payment given by this more 
specific contract. 
Yet, an incentive contract is not necessarily in dis-
credit of the contracting farmer who can benefit not 
only a minimum utility but also a minimum pay-
ment. Our theoretical aim is to use the weather sig-
nal and a constraint of a minimum payment for 
every point of farmer’s environmental output to 
improve and so to make more attractive an envi-
ronmental incentive contract binding a farmer: we 
consider ex ante contracts. 
First, we clarify the climatic effect in the contract in 
order to consider it in two different ways. The first 
usual way considers the climatic effect on average 
on the distribution of probability of the output (type 
0 contract). The remuneration only depends on the 
environmental output. The second way considers the 
effect of the distribution of probabilities of output 
and climatic variable (type 1 contract) on a new 
payment function that depends on the environmental 
output and on the climatic variable. The contractual 
payment that we study is non-linear in order to 
cover the question as generally as possible. 
Second, we consider these contracts with a mini-
mum farmer’s payment as well as a minimum 
farmer’s utility. We want to study consequences of 
an increase of this minimum payment, for a given 
minimum farmer’s utility, by an acute use of the 
climatic signal in a type 1 incentive contract.  
The paper is organized as follows. We give the set 
of hypotheses relative to the modelling. We present 
a first model that ensures a payment that depends on 
the farmer’s environmental performance, by consid-
ering the average effect of a weather variable on the 
farmer’s output (type 0 contract). Then we propose 
to modify the contract by ensuring the farmer a 
payment which depends both on the farmer’s envi-
ronmental performance and on the value of the 
weather variable (type 1 contract). Then, we study 
these contracts theoretically by considering a con-
straint of a minimum payment for every point of 
farmer’s output. The results are compared and ana-
lyzed before concluding.  
1. Method: the different incentive contracts
We assume a farmer whose outdoors activity is de-
pendent on weather conditions. We assume that this 
farmer is bound by an environmental incentive con-
tract that seeks to increase farmer’s environmental 
production. Nevertheless, we consider the two types 
of incentive contracts.  
We consider a farmer’s effort that is not observable 
to the principal. The principal can identify and 
measure the environmental production value x 
which is assumed to be easily and physically meas-
urable. The cumulative distribution for result x  will 
be a function, ( )F x y e_  , conditioned by a weather
variable y  and the effort e . We suppose: 
 ( ) 0eF x y e
c _  d  and  ( ) 0yF x y ec _  d  with inequal-
ity on a set with a non-null measure, and the ex-
pected value of result x  will be increasing in e  and 
in y . We also define ( )G y  as the cumulative dis-
tribution function for the weather variable y .  
1.1. Contract with a standard payment. The ex-
pected principal’s utility ( )V   resulting from the
production x , net of the total cost of the remunera-
tion 0(1 ) ( )t xJ  paid to the farmer (the cost of the
management of one unit of private fund 0 ( )t x  is J )
and of the fixed cost c  of the monitoring, is maxi-
mized under the constraints of the maximizing of the 
utility (.)U  which the farmer derives from the remu-
neration received, taking into account its cost func-
tion ( )w e , and the reservation farmer’s utility 0U . 
Functions ( )V   and ( )U   are increasing and non
convex. Function ( )w   is increasing and convex. We
calculate a payment function 0( )t  . Variable x  is
defined in [ ]x x  and variable y  in [ ]y y .
We determine a payment function 0( )t x  with the 
utilities functions V , U  and cost function w : 
0
0
( )
max [ ( (1 ) ( ))] ( ) ( )
y xe t
V x c t x dF x y e dG yJ     _ ³ ³   (1) 
under the constraints, adopting a first order ap-
proach1: 
0 0( ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( )
y x
U t x w e dF x y e dG y U _  t³ ³ ,  (2)
0( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )e
y x
U t x dF x y e dG y w ec_   ³ ³ .  (3) 
When the payment is dependent on the results alone, 
the weather conditions are treated on average with 
( ) ( ) ( )
y
F x e F x y e dG y_  _ ³  and the former pro-
gram is equivalent to: 
0
0
( )
max [ ( (1 ) ( ))] ( )
xe t
V x c t x dF x eJ     _³   (4) 
under the constraints (2) and (3) simplified. 
We note O  and P  the Lagrangian multipliers asso-
ciated with constraints (2) and (3). The first order 
condition with respect to t(x) is used to calculate the 
transfer: 
1 By supposing the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), the convex-
ity of the distribution function (CDF) and the linearity of W, we have the 
following sufficient conditions: ( ) 0e
f
x y e
x f
w _  !w and 0eeF ! . 
          exffµȜxtU xtȖcxVȖ e c c 11 .  (5) 
For example, and if V is the identity function, the 
payment function is with 0P !  (Holmström, 1979)
or (Shavell, 1979): 
   ]
1
[)
1
( 10 Ȗ
ex
f
f
µȜ
U
xt
e

c  .  (6) 
The first order condition with respect to e, the first 
order conditions relative to constraints (2) and (3) 
are used to determine respectively the Lagrangian 
multipliers O , P  and the optimal effort e. The
payment will be an increasing function of x if the 
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) of the 
distribution function F holds: ( ) 0e
f
x y e
x f
w _  !w
(Grossman and Hart, 1983). 
As well as participation constraint (2), we want a 
minimum payment for every point of the output. So, 
to the expectation constraints (2) and (3) are added 
the constraints: 
0( ( )) ( )U t x U tt , x .
To the necessary first order conditions associated 
with constraints (2) and (3) are added the conditions 
relative to these constraints (with the associated 
Lagrangian multiplierG ): 
0( ) ( ( )) 0x U t xG   with
( ) 0xG t  for all x. One infers the payment:
     )]1,1[max()1( 10 Ȗ exffµȜtUUxt ecc  .  (7) 
In addition, using specific techniques (Carlier and 
Dana, 2005), one may then secure the growth in 
payment as a function of x, taking into account the 
constraint on the minimum payment. This result is 
of course obtained by assuming that the distribu-
tion F confirms the MLRP.  
In this case, the payment only depends on the results 
alone, independently of the direct influence of 
climate on the results. So, if the climate is favorable 
to the farmer, the farmer could receive too high 
payment compared to the remuneration he would 
receive with a more precise contract in terms of 
weather and conversely1. 
1.2. Contract with a new payment mode. We de-
termine a payment function ( )t x y  with the utilities
1 This characteristic exists with an environmental output strongly 
depending on the weather conditions: nitrate pollution of running water 
or rainfall-erosion losses in any watershed. 
functions V, U and cost function w. As the payment 
depends on x and on y, this program is different 
from the previous one: 
( )
max [ ( (1 ) ( ))] ( ) ( )
y xe t
V x c t x y dF x y e dG yJ      _ ³ ³   (8) 
under the constraints, adopting a first order ap-
proach:  
0( ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( )
y x
U t x y w e dF x y e dG y U  _  t³ ³ , (9)
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )e
y x
U t x y dF x y e dG y w ec _   ³ ³ .  (10) 
For example, if V is the identity function, the pay-
ment function is:  
1
'
( )1
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
  _   
ef
f
x y e
t x y
U
O P J   (11) 
for a payment without constraint of minimum pay-
ment and then  
1
' '
( )1 1
( ) ( ) [max( )]
( ) 1
  _    
ef
f
x y e
t x y
U U t
O P J (12) 
with a minimum payment ( )t x y t t .
This payment ( )t x y  depends on the result x  and the
climate y , while the payment given by a complete-
information contract (program (8) with constraint (9)) 
is constant: 
1
' '
1 1 )
( , ) ( ) [max ( ) ]
( ) 1
  ct x y U U t O J . 
Moreover, it is not possible to infer the effort if the 
principal can observe the weather and knows the dis-
tribution function ( )_ F x y e  because x  and y are
random variables. 
2. Theory and calculation
First, we study the theoretical property of the type 1 
contract comparatively to the type 0 contract, by con-
sidering a minimum payment in the two contracts. 
Secondly, we want to illustrate our result by con-
ducting a numerical simulation of the two contracts. 
Our aim is to understand the link between our theo-
retical result and the level of the farmer’s environ-
mental effort in the two contracts.  
2.1. Condition to improve the contract with a 
new payment mode. We note the type 0  contract 
with a payment t0 (x) and the type 1  contract with a 
1( )t x y  payment.
Noted respectively ( ) 0 1   iE U t i  the utility ex-
pectation of the principal in the types 0 and 1 con-
tract, for a minimum farmer’s expected utility U  
and a minimum payment t  for every result x . 
We fix a new payment minimum 
0t  and an farmer’s 
expected utility 
0U . If 0 0 ( ) e t  are the optimal
solutions of the first contract, we deduce the effec-
tive expected utility of the farmer: 
0 0 0 0( ( ( )) ( )) ( )
x
U U t x w e dF x e  _³   (13) 
with 00 UU d  and of course: 0 0 00 0 0( ) ( )  E E UU t t .
We have 0 0 1 00 0( ) ( )  E U E Ut t because the con-
tract with an explicit acknowledgement of the indi-
cator of the weather dominates the classic contract 
(Shavell, 1979). 
For 1 0!U U , one then gets 1 1 1 00 0( ) ( ) d E U E Ut t .
Assuming that 1 0 0( )E U t  depends continuously on
0U  and 0t , there exists 0H !  such that:
0 0 1 0 1 00 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )    d E U E U E Ut t tH .  (14) 
A sufficient condition of the continuity of 
1 0 0
( )E U t  in relation to 0U  and 0t  is the Lagran-
gian concavity for the calculation 1 0 0( )E U t . In
addition, a sufficient condition on this concavity is 
the convexity distribution function condition (CDF), 
0eeF !  if w  is linear in e  ( 2 2 0e eF !  if w  is quad-
ratic). We may then increase, by using a minimum 
farmer’s payment and by switching from the first 
to the second contract, the farmer’s expected utility 
without penalizing the principal. So, to make more 
attractive an environmental incentive contract, the 
simultaneous use of a minimum payment and a cli-
matic signal is relevant. 
Moreover and likewise, there is H c  such that:
0 0 1 0 1 00 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )c    d E U E U E Ut t tH .  (15) 
One therefore may increase the level of the mini-
mum farmer’s payment to an identical expected 
utility of the farmer without penalizing the principal. 
We retain this result to state the following proposi-
tion about the minimum farmer payment and farmer 
or principal expected utility.  
Proposition. If the probability distribution of x veri-
fies MLRP and CDF conditions for all result x, the 
type 1 contract compared to a type 0 contract, with a 
minimum payment of the farmer for every point of 
the farmer’s output, strictly may generate an in-
creasing of the minimum farmer’s payment to an 
identical expected utility of the farmer and without 
penalizing the principal.  
2.2. A numerical simulation of contracts. We pro-
pose, basing ourselves on a set of theoretical hypothe-
ses, to conduct a numerical simulation of the type 0 
contract and the type 1 contract, implemented with 
constraint on the payment to understand the level of 
the farmer’s environmental effort in the two contracts. 
The probability distribution on the weather variable 
and the probability distribution on the results ob-
tained by the contracting farmer are theoretical. 
The probability distribution on the results is: ( )_   F x y e  
exp( )
  ny exp  with p = 2.5 and n = 2.5. This prob-
ability distribution verifies the MLRP and CDF 
conditions. The discrete probability distribution K of 
the weather variable associates to the values yi: 
1,1875; 2,3125; 3,4375 ; 4,5625; 5,6875 the corre-
sponding discrete probabilities pi: 3 51 , , ,13 13 13
3 1,
13 13
. The farmer is risk-averse: 
1( )u t t D . The
cost function is 
2( )w e k e   with 01k    and 50D  .
The results concerning the level of effort, the ex-
pected utility of the farmer and the level of princi-
pal’s gross expected utility (without deduction of 
the cost of monitoring) are indicated in the Table 1. 
They were obtained by considering that parameter y 
is equal to .4. 
Table 1. Expected utility in usual contract (type 0) 
and modified contract (type 1) with a constraint of 
minimum payment 
Type of 
contract 
Level of 
effort 
Constraint of 
minimum payment 
Principal’s
gross expected 
utility
Farmer’s 
expected 
utility 
0 0.637 1 2.147 1.054 
1 0.772 1.0375 2.168 1.054 
So, increasing of the level of the minimum farmer’s 
payment to an identical expected utility of the 
farmer and without penalizing the principal in a type 
1 contract is possible because the level of the 
farmer’s environmental effort is higher in a type 1 
contract than in type 0 contract.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The construction of an incentive contract is not an 
easy task because numerous conditions are required 
to make such a contract reality. 
We assumed this necessary step achieved: new agri-
cultural practices and their costs, their results and 
their factors of variation were learned and known. 
But this step is not a sufficient condition to imple-
ment an incentive contract.  
Of course, during the implementation of the con-
tract, resources to achieve the contract are supposed 
clearly defined and objectives are workable. More-
over, such incentive contracts correspond perfectly 
to the implementation of an obligation of results by 
the contracting agent vis-à-vis the principal.  
The contract is built so that the utility of the con-
tracting agent, which is always above a certain level, 
varies according to a law of probability because the 
payment is not constant. The variability of the con-
tractor’s gain is real and so can be difficult to accept 
by any contracting agent.  
The introduction of a minimum payment assures  that 
the variability of the payment is balanced by the 
certainty of the minimum payment. Moreover, the 
increase of this minimum payment, of course, en-
ables the contracting farmer to have a return on his 
costs more easily. So, the use of a minimum 
farmer’s payment could be very conclusive to bind a 
farmer by an environmental contract.  
But it is also interesting for the principal because 
first, the principal as an environmental agency is not 
losing in terms of utility and second, the environ-
mental output becomes significantly stronger. 
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